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NOTES AND COMMENTS
all his estate, describing it as "being the one-half interest in the com-
munity property now owned by me and my said wife." It was found
that the testator owned the property individually, and the court held
that his descriptive language could only be regarded as the expression
of his opinion and did not convert the property into commnunity prop-
erty or operate as a devise of half thereof to his wife. The children
took all."
By the holding in the principal case it is apparent that the North
Carolina Supreme Court has extended the doctrine of devises and be-
quests by implication further than it had yet done. The result it reaches
is in conflict with the holdings of the jurisdictions discussed above. Yet
it seems that the result may well be the more desirable one, since it more
probably accords with the testator's intent as to whom the property
should go.
PAUL McMuRRAY
Workmen's Compensation-Injuries Sustained by Employee
While Going to and from Work
In Hardy v. Swall deceased, a thirteen year old boy, lived with
his family on the farm of. defendant under an arrangement whereby the
family paid no rent, but was allowed to occupy a house owned by de-
fendant in return for farm labor supplied by the family. Deceased lived
on the east side of a public highway which ran through defendant's farm,
and he had the duty of feeding defendant's livestock at a barn located
350 to 400 feet from his home on the west side of the highway. De-
ceased was required to feed the livestock twice a day and was paid
$1.50 per week for this service. On November 30, 1955, deceased had
crossed the highway, gone to the barn, fed the livestock, and was return-
ing to his home when he was struck by an automobile on the highway
and killed. Compensation proceedings were instituted.2 The Industrial
Commission found that the death was by accident rising out of and in
1 See Circuitt v. Perry, 23 Beav. 275, 53 Eng. Rep. 108 (Rolls 1856). Where
X willed all his real and personal property to Y but stated that on his death,
part of his father's property would, under his father's will, devolve upon his
nephews, when in fact the property then belonged to X, held, the property
of the father's estate did not pass to the nephews under X's will.
1246 N.C. 581, 99 S.E.2d 862 (1957).
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-13 (b) (1950) expressly excepts farm labor from the
provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act, but provides that if any employer
of farm labor has -purchased workmen's compensation insurance or insurance to
cover his compensation liability the employer shall be conclusively presumed, during
the life of the policy, to have accepted the provisions of the act. Defendant in
this case had such a policy which was active at the time of the death of the
decedent.
1958]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
the course of the employment 3 within the purview of the Workmen's
Compensation Act 4 and granted compensation. On appeal this was
affirmed by the superior court and the supreme court.
The opinion recognized the general rule that an injury by accident
is not compensable if sustained by the employee while on his way to or
returning from the premises where the work of his employment is per-
formed." However, exceptions to this rule have developed in North
Carolina and compensation has been allowed where the employee was
going to or returning from the place of his employment if: the employer
either expressly6 or impliedly7 furnished a vehicle for that purpose; the
employer pays the expense of transportation ;S the employer provides a
method for transportation of the employees as an incident of the con-
tract of employment ;9 the employee was performing a "special mission"
' The court rejected the contention made by defendant that the employee was an
independent contractor. See McCraw v. Calvine Mills, Inc., 233 N.C. 524,
64 S.E.2d 658 (1951); Hayes v. Elon College, 224 N.C. 11, 29 S.E.2d 137 (1944).
'N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 97-1 to -122 (1950).5 Bryan v. T. A. Loving Co. & Associates, 222 N.C. 724, 24 S.E.2d 751 (1943);
Lassiter v. Carolina Tel. & Tel. Co., 215 N.C. 227, 1 S.E.2d 542 (1939); Bray
v. W. H. Weatherly & Co., 203 N.C. 160, 165 S.E. 332 (1932) ; Hunt v. State,
201 N.C, 707, 61 S.E. 203 (1931); 1 LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW
§ 15.10 (1952); 8 SCHNEIDER, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION TEXT § 1710 (1951).
' Phifer's Dependents v. Foremost Dairy, Inc., 200 N.C. 65, 156 S.E. 147 (1939).
Employer provided employee with a truck to be used for the purpose of going to
and coming from work. Employee was killed in a collision while on his way
from his home to the employer's plant. Compensation award was affirmed.
7 Smith v. Gastonia, 216 N.C. 517, 5 S.E.2d 540 (1939). Employee, a motor-
cycle policeman, was assigned a motorcycle with the understanding that he could
leave it at city hall or ride it home. Employee had made a practice of riding the
motorcycle home at night. On one such trip he was struck by an automobile
and killed. Held, compensation allowed. But see Alford v. Quality Chevrolet
Co., 246 N.C. 214, 97 S.E.2d 869 (1957) (an unreasonable interval of time lapsed
between employee's departure and his trip home so that no compensation was
awarded, even though employer had furnished employee an automobile for the
purpose of coming to and going from the place of employment).
8 Puett v. Bahnson Co., 231 N.C. 74, 58 S.E.2d 633 (1950). Employer paid
automobile expenses and employee drove his own car to the place of employment.
An accident occurred on one such trip and employee was injured. The award of
compensation was affirmed. But see Hunt v. State, 201 N.C. 707, 161 S.E. 203
(1931) (compensation was not allowed when the employer only paid employees
wages during the trip, and employee paid his own automobile expenses). The
question of injuries sustained by an employee while using public transportation
at the employer's expense has not arisen in North Carolina.
'Edwards v. T. A. Loving Co., 203 N.C. 189, 165 S.E. 356 (1932). Employer
furnished a truck which picked the employees up and transported them from their
homes to the place of employment. Employees were entitled to use the convey-
ance by virtue of their contract of employment. Employee was allowed compensa-
tion when injured while on the conveyance being transported to work. But see
Lassiter v. Carolina Tel. & Tel. Co., 215 N.C. 227, 1 S.E.2d 203 (1931) (com-
pensation was refused when the transportation was furnished gratuitously or as
a mere accommodation). See also Mion v. Atlantic Marble Co., 217 N.C. 743, 9
S.E.2d 501 (1940). Employer-provided conveyance was overcrowded. Employer's
foreman gave employee the option of "crowding in" or riding with another em-
ployee .who had driven his own car for personal convenience. Employee chose




at the request of the employer ;1o the employee makes use of the streets
after the hours of his regular employment in the performance of a duty
connected to the employment, as shown by an established custom."
The question presented in the Hardy case was one of first instance
in North Carolina and, by affirming the award of compensation, the
court aligned itself with other jurisdictions which on one of several
theories have allowed compensation in specific instances for street in-
juries12 and closely analogous railroad crossing injuries sustained by an
employee while going to or coming from work.13 Most of the cases have
adopted the theory that if the point at which the injury occurred, even
though it is not on the premises of the employer, lies on the only route,
or at least the normal route, which the employees must traverse to reach
the place of employment, then the hazards of that route become the
hazards of the employment.14 The North Carolina Supreme Court
'* Massey v. Board of Education, 204 N.C. 193, 167 S.E. 695 (1933). Claimant
was employed as a janitor at a rural school and had been instructed by the principal
to stop by a grocery store and purchase cleaning supplies. Claimant left his home
on the way to work and was crossing a street to the grocery store when he was
struck by an automobile. Compensation award affirmed. But see Davis v. North
State Veneer Corp., 200 N.C. 263, 156 S.E. 859 (1931). The employee made a
voluntary "special errand" during his off duty hours, and it was held that injury
occasioned when the employee was struck by an automobile and killed while on
this mission was not an injury arising out of and in the course of the employment.
See also Wilkie v. Stancil, 196 N.C. 794, 147 S.E. 296 (1929).
"
1Hinkle v. Lexington, 239 N.C. 105, 79 S.E.2d 220 (1953), 32 N.C.L. REV.
372 (1954). Employee was a cemetery keeper for the city. His duties were to
care for the city cemeteries, to cut the grass, sell cemetery lots, dig graves, remove
surplus dirt, and perform such other duties as were incidental to the position of
cemetery keeper. It was his custom nearly every evening, and had been for
many years, to visit the funeral homes of the city to learn if any graves were to
be dug, funerals arranged, or cemetery lots sold. On the night of his death
employee had finished his duties at the cemetery and set out on his usual rounds
from his home to the funeral homes, but in crossing a street he was struck by an
automobile and killed. Compensation was awarded on the ground that the injury
arose out of and in the course of the employment.
" Canoy v. State, 113 W.Va. 914, 918, 170 S.E. 184, 186 (1933), is closely
analogous to the Hardy case. In the Canoy case the employer operated a mine,
with the mine site located on one side of the highway and housing owned by the
employer located on the other side. An employee was killed by an automobile as
he crossed the highway while returning from his day's work at the mine. Com-
pensation was allowed. The court stated, "[W]e are of the opinion that the
use of the place of injury at the time thereof is shown to have been within the
course of and resulting from the employment of claimant's decedent, by an express
or implied requirement of the contract of employment of its use by the workman in
going to and returning from his work." It was shown that crossing the road
was the only method by which the employee could reach his home.
' A somewhat related problem, on the question of the extent of coverage
afforded "travelling employees" under the workmen's compensation laws, is the
subject of a Note appearing in 23 N.C.L. REv. 159 (1944).
"Judson Mfg. Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 184 Cal. 300, 184 Pac. 1 (1919);
Jaynes v. Potlach Forest, Inc., 75 Idaho 297, 271 P.2d 1016 (1954) ; Fennimore v.
Union Constr. & Holding Co., 22 N.J. Misc. 33, 35 A.2d 32 (1943); 1 LARSON,
WORKMfEN'S COMPENSATioN LAw § 15.13 (1952). Two Utah cases, Bountiful
Brick Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 68 Utah 600, 151 Pac. 555 (1926), and Cudahy
Packing Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 60 Utah 161, 207 Pac. 148 (1922), are based
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recognized, but refused to adopt this theory in Bryan v. T. A. Loving
Co. & Associates.115 A second theory for allowing compensation in the
going and coming cases is based upon the concept that the premises of
the employer should be extended for a "reasonable time and distance"
to afford the employee protection after he has come within the "zone"
of employment.16 This theory is troublesome in its application and
gives inconsistent results, as there is no established basis for deter-
mining what is a reasonable distance. 17 The third theory allows com-
pensation whenever the employee is injured by employment hazards
which extend beyond the premises of the employer.' 8 The fourth theory
on this theory. In both cases the employee was killed as he crossed a railway
track in order to reach his employer's premises. From a judgment in each case
awarding compensation, appeal was taken to the United States Supreme Court,
where the cases were heard as Bountiful Brick Co. v. Giles, 276 U.S. 154 (1928),
and Cudahy Packing Co. v. Parramore, 263 U.S. 418 (1923), respectively. The
cases were appealed on the ground that an award of compensation in these cir-
cumstances was in violation of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment
of the United States Constitution. The court rejected this contention, and in
affirming the holding of the Parramore case said: "Here the location of the plant
was at a place so situated as to make the customary and only practicable way of
ingress and egress one of hazard. Parramore could not, at the point of the
accident, select his way. He had no other choice than to go over the railway
tracks in order to get to his work; and was in effect invited to do so. And this
he had to do regularly and continuously as a necessary concomitant of his employ-
ment, resulting in a degree of exposure to the common risk beyond that to which
the public generally was subjected." Id. at 426. The Giles case was also affirmed
even though there were other routes of entrance available.
'-222 N.C. 724, 24 S.E.2d 751 (1943). The employee, who worked as a guard
at the gate of a marine base, arrived at work on a bus which discharged him
across the highway from the entrance. He was killed by an automobile as he
attempted to cross to the gate. A part of the employee's duties included directing
traffic in the highway during rush hours. The court specifically held that de-
fendant's premises did not include the street where the employee sometimes worked.
In reversing the judgment awarding compensation the court held that the em-
ployee was subjected to no more extraordinary risk than any other person using
the highway. Cf. Guient v. Mathieson Chemical Corp., 41 So. 2d 493 (La. App.
1949). In the Bryan case the court discussed Bountiful Brick Co. v. Giles, supra
note 14, as precedent but rejected that case on the grounds that: (1) the Utah
Workmen's Compensation Act makes injuries arising out of or in the course of
employment compensable, whereas the North Carolina Act requires the injury to
arise out of and in the course of the employment, and that because of this differ-
ence the Utah courts interpreted "in the course of" the employment to include "a
reasonable margin of time and space necessary to be used in passing to and from
the place where the work is to be done"; and (2) the United States Supreme
Court only decided that the Utah Workmen's Compensation Act as so applied
does not contravene the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.
" Barnett v. Britling Cafeteria Co., 225 Ala. 462, 143 So. 813 (1932) (this
case was also rejected in the Bryan case on the grounds that it was in direct
conflict with prior North Carolina decisions) ; Leatham v. Thurston & Braidich,
264 App. Div. 449, 35 N.Y.S.2d 887 (1942); Industrial Comm'n v. Barber, 117
Ohio St. 373, 159 N.E. 363 (1927).
"' Compare Barnett v. Britling Cafeteria Co., supra note 16, in which the
employee was "immediately" outside of the entrance to the employer's premises
and preparing to enter, with Boles v. Service Club, 208 Ark. 692, 187 S.W.2d
321 (1925), where employee was 31 feet from the entrance.
nFreire v. Matson Navigation Co., 19 Cal. 2d 8, 118 P.2d 809 (1941). This
was a common law action in which employee wvas injured by a taxicab in a
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allows compensation where the employee travels along or across a public
road between two portions of his employer's premises, whether going or
coming or pursuing his active duties.19 The reasoning here is that once
the employee has come onto the premises of the employer he is within
the scope of his employment and subject to the control of his employer.
Thus if while in the performance of his duties he is required to cross
a highway or railroad track which runs through his employer's premises
he does so as an incident of the employment, and if injured while negoti-
ating the hazard, then such injury is within the scope of his employment
and compensable.2 0  This theory, apparently the one adopted in the
Hardy case,21 has been applied in allowing compensation in cases where
an employee is injured while crossing a highway or railroad track which
separates the employer's plant from company owned housing22 or from
a parking lot2 3 maintained by the employer for the convenience of the
employees. But in Horn v. Sandhill Furniture Co.24 the employee was
public street while on the way to work. As the traffic congestion was created
by vehicles and persons which had come to do business with the employer, it was
held that the employee's exclusive remedy was under the Workmen's Compensa-
tion Act. The argument of the Freire case is based on much the same reasoning
as was rejected in the Bryan case. In the Bryan case the hearing commissioner
found that more than 90% of the traffic where employee was working was com-
posed of employees of defendant employer and other workmen who were erecting
the marine base and that employee was subjected to an extraordinary and greater
hazard of being injured by an automobile than that to which the public generally
was subjected or that was common to the neighborhood. This reasoning was
adopted by the full Industrial Commission, which found that the employee was in
the "ambit" of his employment and affirmed the hearing commissioner. The
supreme court rejected this argument and held that on the contrary, he was at
the time on the way to his place of employment. The Freire case, cited in the
opinion, was held to be factually distinguishable, as the hazard in that case was
created by other employees of the company as such and not as members of society
at large. See also 1 LARsoN, WoRKmEN's COmpENSATioN LAW § 15.31 (1952).
" Kuharski v. Bristol Brass Corp., 132 Conn. 563, 46 A.2d 11 (1946); 1
LARSON, WORKMEN'S COmPENSATiON LAW § 15.14 (1952).
20 Corvi v. Stiles & Reynolds Brick Corp., 103 Conn. 449, 130 Atl. 674 (1925);
McMillin v. Calco Chemical Co., 157 N.J. Misc. 68, 188 Atl. 694 (1936) ; Texas
Employer's Ins. Ass'n v. Anderson, 125 S.W.2d 674 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939). See
also Meissner v. Good Samaritan Hospital, 271 App. Div. 1041, 68 N.Y.S.2d 507
(Sup. Ct. 1947). Employee slept in one building owned by employer and worked
in another. He was killed as he crossed a street between the two buildings. The
award of compensation was affirmed in a per curiam opinion on the grounds that
an "inference" could be drawn that decedent was "in the precinct of his employ-
ment" when the accident occurred. Compare, supra note 18, "precinct" as used in
this case with "ambit" in the Bryan case, and "zone" in Barnett v. Britling Cafe-
teria Co., 225 Ala. 462, 143 So. 813 (1932). All of these terms are used by the
courts to denote instances where the compensation laws are broadened beyond
the premises of the employer.
"1 In the Hardy case the court, though citing American Law Reports notes,
did not cite specific cases from other jurisdictions, and for that reason it is difficult
to ascertain the exact theory adopted, but the case seems to fit in this category.
22 See note 12 supra.
23 Pacific Indemnity Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 28 Cal. 2d 329,
170 P.2d 18 (1946) ; McCrae v. Eastern Aircraft, 137 N.J. Misc. 244, 59 A.2d 376
(1948).2' 245 N.C. 173, 95 S.E2d 521 (1956).
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injured while crossing a public highway which separated the employer's
plant from a parking lot which was owned by the employer and used
by the employees with its consent. Compensation was refused on the
grounds that the injury did not arise out of and in the course of the
employment, as the employee's duties as a laborer in the plant did not
require him to be in the highway at the place where the automobile
struck him.25
The decision in the Hardy case is another, but it is believed reason-
able, step in the general trend26 of broadening the concept of injuries
arising out of and in the course of the employment. It does not abrogate
the rule regarding injuries sustained by employees while going to and
coming from the premises of the employer, but allows an exception
which is not so broad as to open a gap which would let in a flood of
other "off the premises injuries cases."
GILEs R. CLARK
21 In the Horn case employee was injured as he crossed the street to eat his
lunch which he had left in his automobile. He was not paid during his lunch
hour and the court held that he was on a "personal errand" at the time of his
injuries. If going to and from the place of employment for lunch is not to be
distinguished from going to and from work in general, it would seem that the
holding of this case is somewhat weakened by the holding of the Hardy case.
"Probably the best example of this trend is found in two Idaho cases. In
State ex rel. Gallet v. Clearwater Timber Co., 47 Idaho 295, 274 Pac. 802 (1929),
employee was killed by a train as he attempted to cross a railroad track lying
across the only road giving access to the employer's plant. Compensation was
denied on the grounds that employee was not on the premises of the employer
at the time of his death, but rather was coming to work, and as he had not
actually reachecf the premises he had not come into the area where protection was
given. In Jaynes v. Potlach Forest, Inc., 75 Idaho 297, 271 P.2d 1016 (1954), a
similar accident happened at the same location. The court in allowing com-
pensation expressly overruled the Gallet case declaring that changing trends in
the workmen's compensation law justified such a change.
[Vol. 36
